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Abstract
In this paper we distinguish between three channels that determine attitudes to further immi-
gration: labour market concerns, welfare concerns, and racial or cultural concerns. Our analysis
is based on the British Social Attitudes Survey. A unique feature of the survey is that it includes
questions on attitudes towards immigration from different origin countries, with populations dif-
fering in ethnic similarity to the resident population. It also contains sets of questions relating
directly to the labour market, beneﬁt expenditure and welfare concerns, and racial and cultural
prejudice. Based on this unique data source, we specify and estimate a multiple factor model
that allows comparison of the relative magnitude of association of attitudes to further immigration
with the three channels, as well as comparison in responses across potential immigrant groups of
different origin. Our results suggest that, overall, welfare concerns play a more important role
in determination of attitudes to further immigration than labour market concerns, with their rela-
tive magnitude differing across potential emigration regions and characteristics of the respondent.
In addition, we ﬁnd strong evidence that racial or cultural prejudice is an important component
to attitudes towards immigration; however, this is restricted to immigration from countries with
ethnically different populations.
KEYWORDS: international migration, attitudes
Department of Economics and Centre for Research and Analysis of Migration (CReAM), Uni-
versity College London and Institute for Fiscal Studies, London. email: c.dustmann@ucl.ac.uk;
i.preston@ucl.ac.uk. We are grateful for comments and suggestions from Joseph Altonji, George
Borjas, David Card, Edward Glaeser, Timothy Hatton, Hidehiko Ichimura, Zig Layton-Henry, Al-
bert Satorra, Christoph M. Schmidt, Frank Windmeijer, and two anonymous referees. We thank
the Nufﬁeld Foundation for funding this research.1 Introduction
The debate on immigration features highly on the political agenda both in
Europe and in the US. The economic consequences of immigration for the
native population, the perceived e⁄ects on cultural identity and social cohe-
sion, and the strong feelings involved make immigration a topic which ￿gures
prominently in political campaigning. Regulations concerning immigration
are frequently adjusted according to changes in the economic situation. Often
however it is not the economic considerations alone, but shifts in general atti-
tudes of the public towards immigration that lead to re-design of immigration
policies. To understand what drives individual preferences over immigration
policies is thus an important research area, both for descriptive political econ-
omy and for policy design, and recently a literature has developed that analyses
this.
A prime concern often thought to in￿ uence the way preferences over further
immigration are formed is the way in which individuals perceive the e⁄ects of
immigration on the labour market. In an important paper on attitudes to-
wards further immigration, Scheve and Slaughter (2001) suggest that the way
individuals assess these e⁄ects may relate to basic intuitions about labour mar-
ket equilibria.1 Simple models with a single output good and multiple labour
types (see for example, Altonji and Card, 1991) do point to a possibility for
immigration to harm those workers who compete with immigrants.2 Scheve
and Slaughter (2001) report a strong relationship between education and more
favourable attitudes to further immigration, which is consistent with the hy-
pothesis that the low skilled are opposed to immigration because of a fear of
labour market competition. Mayda (2005), arguing within a similar theoretical
setting and using cross-country data, ￿nds evidence for a positive correlation
between individual skill level and pro-immigration attitudes in countries where
the relative skill ratio of natives to immigrants is high. Using cross-state varia-
1Other papers that analyse the determinants of individual preferences over immigration
policies in several countries include Gang, Rivera-Batiz and Yun (2002), Mayda (2005),
Fertig and Schmidt (2002), Bauer, Lofstrom and Zimmermann (2001), O￿ Rourke and Sinnott
(2003), Hanson, Scheve and Slaughter (2004, 2005) and Facchini and Mayda (2006). Aslund
and Rooth (2005) study shifts in attitudes in response to the terrorist attacks of 9/11.
2Empirical evidence establishing the existence of adverse e⁄ects is scarce (see Borjas
1999b, and Friedberg and Hunt 1995 for overviews), although there is an ongoing debate
on the issue (see e.g. Card 2005 and Borjas 2003 for diverging views). Lewis (2003, 2005)
tests the hypothesis of two alternative adjustment mechanisms to immigration, adjustment
through output mix (see the discussions in Leamer and Levinsohn 1995, and Gaston and
Nelson 2000), and within-industry technology adjustment, and ￿nds strong evidence for the
latter.
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and conclude that labour market pressures of immigration are an important
determinant of public opinion on immigration restrictions.
Labour market competition may, however, not be the only economic con-
cern which forms preferences over immigration. According to Borjas (1999a,
p.105), the second economic issue in the historical debate over immigration
policy in the United States is whether immigrants pay their way in the welfare
system. He argues that in the US, immigrants receive a disproportionately
large share of the welfare bene￿ts distributed. Borjas (1999a) draws attention
to the possible impact of immigration on dependency ratios and the conse-
quent e⁄ects on the cost of the bene￿t and social security systems. Since,
under progressive taxation, any implied tax burden will bear more heavily on
richer households, this provides a possible reason for greater concern among
those with higher incomes.
There is evidence that public opinion is guided by the view that more immi-
grants are an additional burden on the welfare system. Simon (1989) provides
a history of anecdotal evidence on public opinion towards further immigration,
where both welfare considerations and labour market fears are the two major
concerns. Dustmann and Preston (2005), investigating the determinants of
the economic impact of immigration, ￿nd that welfare considerations are the
largest single factor of concern, and more important than labour market con-
cerns.3 Using cross-state variation in the US, Hanson, Scheve and Slaughter
present evidence that exposure to immigrant ￿scal pressure reduces support
for immigration in particular among the more skilled. Facchini and Mayda
(2006) study welfare-state determinants of individual attitudes towards immi-
grants. Based on cross-country data, they report attitudinal responses which
they argue make sense in the context of a redistributive ￿scal system.
In addition to these two economic determinants, there are also non-economic
channels through which preferences over further immigration may be shaped.
Opposition to immigration may be motivated by reasons which relate to the
cultural and ethnic di⁄erence of the immigrant population. Opposition may
be fueled by a fear of loss of national characteristics and identity, or a taste
for cultural homogeneity. Cultural and ethnic distance may severely hinder
the social integration process, and this may be considered to induce social ten-
sions and costs. There is ample evidence that deeply rooted hostility exists
towards immigration groups with largely di⁄erent cultural and ethnic back-
3Dustmann and Preston￿ s analysis focusses on responses to a question about the economic
consequences of immigration, not on whether immigration regulations should be tightened,
as do most of the other papers cited.
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leaders. For instance, the then opposition leader and future British Prime
Minister Margaret Thatcher referred in a famous 1978 television interview to
a British fear of being ￿rather swamped by people with a di⁄erent culture￿
(Layton-Henry, 1992, p.184). Some of the aforementioned papers present ev-
idence that attitudinal questions regarding concern about identity or crime
(Mayda, 2005) or ideology (Scheve and Slaughter 2001) are indeed associated
with preferences for tighter immigration regulation.
In this paper, we contribute to the literature on attitude formation by
analysing the importance of welfare concerns as well as racial and cultural prej-
udice, alongside labour market concerns, as three key aspects that determine
preferences about immigration. Our methodological approach is to explicitly
model these three channels through which immigration attitudes may be af-
fected. We do this by formulating and estimating a multiple factor model.
The basic idea of our methodology is to use sets of multiple questions address-
ing each of the three dimensions of concern (the labour market, welfare, and
cultural or racial prejudice) and the correlations among responses to identify
common underlying components. We then infer the importance of these in
explaining variation in attitudes to immigration.
The problem with basing conclusions on interpretation of the association
between individual characteristics and immigration attitudes within a labour
market model or/and a welfare model is that the most important character-
istics are associated with attitudes to immigration through di⁄erent channels,
so that the separation of their roles is di¢ cult. For example, the fact that
the highly educated are more liberal in their attitudes may re￿ ect that their
labour market position is less vulnerable to immigration of the typically ex-
pected skill composition. However, it could also re￿ ect the strong association
of education with attitudes to welfare or to culture. In this paper we explic-
itly model the channels through which these may impact on attitudes about
immigration regulation. An important research question which we address is
then the relative contributions of these alternative explanations in explaining
shifts in general attitudes of the public towards immigration, and how indi-
vidual characteristics work through these channels. A further contribution of
our analysis is to separate the role of the three channels in driving attitudes
regarding clearly distinguishable immigrant groups. The data on which our
analysis is based (various waves of the British Social Attitudes Survey, BSA)
allows us to do so, as it is unusual in distinguishing explicitly between atti-
tudes to immigration from di⁄erent regions of origin. Our data also contains
extremely speci￿c geographical information on respondents, which allows us
to merge in objective environmental information at a very precise spatial level
3
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We allow responses of the native population to di⁄er along various di-
mensions. We distinguish between di⁄erent occupation groups (separating
manual and non-manual workers), and di⁄erent education groups (separating
low, medium and high education groups). This allows us to directly investi-
gate the association of cultural and racial prejudice, labour market concerns,
and welfare concerns with preferences towards more immigration across dif-
ferent skill levels. We therefore use a more direct approach than Scheve and
Slaughter (2001) in assessing whether the di⁄erences in relative preferences to-
wards further immigration across skill groups are compatible with predictions
of equilibrium trade and labour market models. Furthermore, the distinction
made in our data between immigrants of di⁄erent ethnic and cultural back-
grounds, allows us to assess the relative association of each of these factors
with preferences towards further immigration for di⁄erent skill groups, and
across immigrant populations of di⁄erent ethnic and cultural dissimilarity.
Our ￿ndings are interesting and novel in several respects. First, our descrip-
tive evidence shows that opposition towards further immigration is strongly
related to the proposed origin of immigrants, with much larger resistance the
more ethnically distinct the immigrant population is. Second, we establish
that welfare concerns are generally a more important driver of attitudes than
labour market concerns, in particular towards groups with a high welfare de-
pendence. These views are strongest among respondents who are likely to be
the biggest contributors if immigration, as sometimes suggested by those most
hostile, induces a tax-￿nanced increase in welfare dependency. Our analysis
also shows that racial/cultural prejudice is an important underlying channel
through which overall attitudes are driven, in particular for the low skilled.
The structure of the paper is as follows. Section 2 outlines our econometric
model, and explains estimation and identi￿cation of the parameters. Section 3
provides a brief overview of migration to the UK, documents skills and occu-
pational achievements of immigrants, and discusses the data we use. Section
4 provides some descriptive evidence. Section 5 presents and discusses results,
and section 6 concludes.
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2.1 Econometric Speci￿cation
The idea of our empirical approach is as follows. The variable we wish to
explain is the respondent￿ s attitude to further immigration. In our data, this
question is asked four times, distinguishing between four di⁄erent origin re-
gions (India/Pakistan, the West Indies, Europe, and Australia/New Zealand).
We relate these responses to three (unobserved) channels (or factors) through
which attitudes may be formed: labour market concerns, welfare concerns,
and cultural or racial prejudice. We identify three sets of questions in the
BSA regarding issues which are each strongly related to one or other of these
channels. Questions regarding labour market security include questions on
the fear of job loss, the ease of ￿nding a job and expected future wage paths.
Questions indicating welfare concerns include a question on adequacy of ben-
e￿t levels, perception of recipients￿needs, and willingness to pay for increased
public social spending. Questions indicating racial or cultural attitudes in-
clude attitudes towards inter-ethnic marriage, having a minority boss, and self
admitted prejudice against minorities. We report the wording of the questions
in Appendix D.
We use responses to these sets of questions to isolate a common element for
each of the three factors. One way of doing this would be to take some average
of each of the three sets of responses for each respondent, and to regress, in
a second step, the overall response to the immigration question on the new
variables obtained in this way. This is conceptually similar to our approach,
which can be thought of as weighting and normalising the single questions
when combining them into a single factor. The approach we follow makes
more e¢ cient use of the data. Further, we adopt a normalisation that allows
comparison of magnitudes of coe¢ cients across the di⁄erent responses.




i = fi ￿ + Xi A + ui ; (1)
fi = Xi B + vi ; (2)
z
￿
i = fi M + Xi C + wi : (3)
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immigration in the 1 ￿ 4 vector y￿
i to the three ￿latent factors￿fi which we
have described above (labour market, welfare, and cultural/racial concerns),
conditional on individual and contextual information Xi. Consequently, fi is
a 1 ￿ 3 vector, with coe¢ cients in the 3 ￿ 4 matrix ￿. As we only observe
discrete responses to questions regarding further immigration, y￿
i is a vector of
latent responses. A is a k ￿ 4 matrix of conditional responses of attitudes to
k other observed characteristics Xi (such as age, education etc.). The term ui
is an error term, and we assume that ui ￿ N(0;￿u). The parameters in the
matrix ￿ are the main parameters of interest; they measure the magnitude of
association between each of the three concerns we consider, and attitudes to
further immigration.
Equation (2) relates the latent factors to the regressors Xi, where B is a
k￿3 matrix of coe¢ cients, and vi ￿ N(0;￿v). Finally, equation (3) relates the
set of responses that relate to each of the three factors, z￿
i, to the latent factors
fi and observed characteristics Xi. In our case, we observe 10 responses that
￿reveal￿the fi: four for labour market concerns, three for welfare concerns,
and three for racial and cultural concerns. Accordingly, z￿
i is a 1 ￿ 10 vector,
M is a 3 ￿ 10 matrix of coe¢ cients, and C is a k ￿ 10 matrix of conditional
responses to Xi. Again, as only discrete responses are observed, z￿
i is a vector
of latent responses. We assume that wi ￿ N(0;￿w):
We further assume that ui and wi are uncorrelated with Xi and fi, which
implies that they are also uncorrelated with vi. Therefore, E[uiv0
i] = ￿uv = 0
and E[wiv0
i] = ￿wv = 0.
Consider now the reduced form equations, which are obtained by substi-
tuting (2) in (1) and (3):
y
￿




i = Xi(BM + C) + wi + vi M = Xi￿2 + ￿2i ; (5)




￿u + ￿￿v ￿0 ￿uw + M ￿v ￿0
￿0










is the (4+10)￿(4+10) variance-covariance matrix of the reduced form residuals
and ￿uw denotes E(uiw0
i).
6
The B.E. Journal of Economic Analysis & Policy, Vol. 7 [2007], Iss. 1 (Advances), Art. 62
http://www.bepress.com/bejeap/vol7/iss1/art62Our estimation strategy now proceeds in three stages. In the ￿rst stage,
we estimate the reduced form coe¢ cient matrix ￿ = [￿1j￿2]0. We do that
by estimating the coe¢ cients of each equation in (4) and (5) (corresponding
to the rows of ￿) separately by independent (ordered) probits. Due to the
discrete nature of the dependent variables, we can only estimate their ratios
to the standard deviations of the associated error components.
In the second stage we obtain the parameters in ￿￿. Again, a normali-
sation assumption is required. We adopt the identifying normalisation that
the diagonal elements in ￿u and in ￿w are such as to make the diagonal ele-
ments of ￿￿ equal to unity. To estimate ￿￿, we take each pairing of questions
successively, and estimate the corresponding o⁄-diagonal component of ￿￿ by
bivariate maximum likelihood. We ￿x the coe¢ cients of the two equations
concerned at the values in ￿ estimated in the previous stage.4
Finally, in the third step we estimate the parameters in M, ￿ and ￿v using
minimum distance estimation and the restrictions ￿22 = ￿w + M ￿v M0 and
￿12 = ￿uw +M ￿v ￿0. To do so, we make the following assumptions. First, we
assume that each of our indicator questions in z￿ is indicative of one and only
one factor. For instance, the three questions on the labour market are assumed
to be a⁄ected only through the labour market channel, the three questions on
welfare concerns only through the welfare channel, and so on. This means
that we assume that MM0 is a block diagonal matrix, with only one non-zero
element in each row of M. Second, we assume that all correlation between
responses to these questions (conditional on the regressors Xi) is accounted
for by the factor structure, which implies diagonality of the ￿w matrix. Notice
that we allow for correlation between the factors, since ￿v is not required to be
diagonal. Finally, we set the diagonal elements of ￿v to unity, which is simply
a normalising assumption.
Given these assumptions, there is su¢ cient information in ￿22 from the con-
ditional correlations between responses within blocks to identify all elements
of M.5
Having identi￿ed M, the o⁄-diagonal elements of ￿v are identi￿ed without
4Consider for instance the responses to the ￿rst two immigration questions, with the
latent two equation model being y￿
1i = Xi￿1 + ￿1i and y￿
2i = Xi￿2 + ￿2i. We estimate the
covariance Cov(￿1i;￿2i) using a bivariate probit likelihood, where we ￿x ￿1 and ￿2 at the
estimates obtained in the ￿rst stage, ^ ￿1 and ^ ￿2.
5Remembering the particular structure of M￿M0, suppose that the ith diagonal block
has qi elements. Then there are qi (qi￿1)=2 o⁄-diagonal elements in the corresponding block
of ￿22 from which to identify them. This is su¢ cient if qi ￿ 3, which is so for each block
in our case. This is not to say that the condition is necessary since there is also identifying
information in the elements of o⁄-diagonal blocks.
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the correlations between elements in di⁄erent blocks. Since all conditional
correlation between responses in di⁄erent blocks is assumed to be driven solely
by the correlation between factors, considerable overidentifying restrictions are
involved at this point. We report tests of these restrictions.
Identi￿cation of ￿ comes from the elements of ￿12. We assume that the
correlation between responses to the immigration questions y￿ and the indica-
tor questions z￿ is accounted for by the factors f, conditional on observables
X. This implies that ￿uw = 0 and therefore ￿12 = M ￿v ￿0. With M and ￿v
identi￿ed before, this is su¢ cient to identify ￿ if p ￿ q, which is to say that
there are fewer factors than indicator questions. With p = 3 and q = 10, this
is clearly the case in our application. To estimate the parameters in M, ￿ and
￿v, we impose in the third stage the restrictions on ￿12 and ￿22 by minimum
distance.
Computation of the variance-covariance matrix of the parameters is de-
scribed in full in Appendix A. The estimation procedure outlined above does
not guarantee positive semi-de￿niteness of the estimated asymptotic variance-
covariance matrix for the parameter estimates, and we describe in the Appen-
dix how we deal with that.6
Our main focus is the coe¢ cients in ￿, and how they relate to each other
in magnitude. Note that ￿ = dy￿
i=dfi and neither y￿
i nor fi, both being
latent, have a unique natural scale of variation. However, the commonality
of normalisation imposed here justi￿es comparability of coe¢ cients within ￿,7
which is important for the interpretation of our results below. Given also the
common form of the questions regarding immigration policy, it makes sense to
compare the elements in ￿ in terms of e⁄ects on probabilities, which is how
we report them below.8
The most critical assumption sustaining a causal interpretation of ￿ is that





words, conditional on observables Xi, all association between y￿
i and z￿
i should
come through the three factors. This assumption would be violated if, for
example, unobserved individual heterogeneity that a⁄ects labour market con-
cerns is at the same time correlated with opposition to further immigration,
conditional on Xi. Although we believe that much of the individual hetero-
6All programs are written by the authors in GAUSS and are available on request.
7That is to say, the residual variances along the diagonals of ￿￿ and ￿v are each set to
unity.
8In other words, we report ￿(Xi￿)￿, where we evaluate X at sample averages so that
the values can be interpreted as the e⁄ect of a one standard deviation change in the relevant
component of fi on the probability of hostility to immigration.
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our observables Xi, we can not exclude this possibility and therefore prefer
to refer to the estimated parameters as "associations" rather than "e⁄ects".
The fact that none of the questions on which the identi￿cation of our factors
is based refer speci￿cally to further immigration can be regarded as reducing
the potential for spurious correlation.
3 Background and Data
3.1 Immigrants in the UK
According to the 2001 UK Census, the percentage of foreign-born individuals
in the British population is 8.3 percent (or 4.9 million), almost twice as high as
in 1951, when the corresponding number was 4.2 percent. Britain has always
been a destination for intra-European immigrants, most notably for the Irish
(Chance, 1996). However, in the post-war period, Britain saw large numbers
of immigrants arriving who were ethnically di⁄erent from the predominantly
white resident population.
Immigration of Commonwealth citizens was most pronounced in the two
decades after the war. While the early 1950s were characterised by migration
from the Caribbean, in the late 1950s a growing number of immigrants ar-
rived from the Indian subcontinent. Later immigrants arrived from Pakistan
and Bangladesh. Labour market shortages in the period after the war led
also to recruitment of European workers to ￿ll certain labour market short-
ages. These workers were predominantly from Southern Europe, but also from
Poland. After the 1971 act, an increasing fraction of immigration was due to
family uni￿cation, which remained for a time largely unrestricted. Favourable
economic conditions in Europe prevented large migrations after 1971. Govern-
mental response to the Ugandan Asian crisis of 1972 nevertheless led, despite
the restrictive legislation adopted by then, to a renewed boost in the settle-
ment of those of Asian origin. For further details on immigration to the UK,
see Wheatley-Price and Hatton (2005) and Spencer (1997).
The questions regarding immigrant origin asked in the BSA and which we
consider in our analysis below, relate to individuals from three immigration
areas: the West Indies, India and Pakistan,9 the area of the (then) European
common market, and Australia/New Zealand. Over the period which we con-
sider (1983-1990), immigrants from these four groups form about 63 percent of
9Throughout the paper, we refer to this source of immigration as "Asian", in line with
wording typically used in the BSA.
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Variable Natives Foreign West Asia European Aust./
Born Indies N.Z.
% of Tot. Imm. Pop. 5.9 20.89 33.55 2.48
Years FT Education 11.24 11.91 11.19 10.89 11.34 13.48
High Education 13.12 19.67 13.81 14.43 15.60 33.87
Inter. Education 47.55 52.64 34.94 33.00 39.75 54.04
Low Education 39.32 39.12 51.26 52.58 44.64 12.09
Age 36.46 40.31 44.79 38.15 44.72 31.96
% Claiming UB 7.70 8.61 14.12 12.22 7.57 4.46
a: Data: British Labour Force Survey (LFS), 1983-1990. Regions de￿nition: Asia:
India, Pakistan, Bangladesh, Asian Ugandans; Europe: EU (old de￿nition, before
1991); Australasia: New Zealand and Australia.
Education: High education: university degree, higher education; Intermediate edu-
cation: A- levels and O-levels and equivalent or other quali￿cation; Low education:
no quali￿cation.
the overall immigrant population in Britain. In table 1 we display some of the
key characteristics of these groups, where numbers are drawn from the British
Labour Force Survey (LFS). Most noteworthy is the educational composition
of the immigrant population. Unlike the US and many European countries,
immigration to the UK is, and has always been, relatively high skilled, with im-
migrants having on average higher levels of schooling than native born whites.10
In the table, we report two measures of education: the years of full-time school-
ing, and three levels of education. On average, immigrants have slightly more
years of education than the native born, but there is variation across the three
groups. The distribution of educational achievement is likewise similar be-
tween the groups, with immigrants being 6 percentage points more likely to
hold a degree or have higher education, while about equally likely to have no
quali￿cation at all. Immigrants from Australia/New Zealand have the highest
level of education, with on average more than 2 years more full-time educa-
tion than white natives, and with 34% obtaining university or post-secondary
higher education, compared with only 13% among natives. Asians and immi-
grants from the West Indies are similar to natives at the high end of the skill
distribution, but have a substantially higher fraction of individuals with low
educational backgrounds. Overall, Australians/New Zealanders appear to be
10Although the table considers only subgroups of immigrants, the same is true for Britain￿ s
overall immigrant population, see Dustmann and Fabbri (2006) for details.
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these numbers, we should expect that labour market competition should be a
concern for the highly skilled when assessing immigration from New Zealand
and Australia, and for the low skilled for immigration from the West Indies
and Asia.
In the last row, we display the percentage in each of the groups that claims
unemployment bene￿t. Here immigrants are overall more likely to be claimants
than natives, but there is considerable variation across groups, with the West
Indian and Asian immigrants having probabilities to claim unemployment ben-
e￿ts that are twice as high as those of white natives, while immigrants from
Europe are similar, and immigrants from Australia and New Zealand substan-
tially less likely. If potential new immigrants are similar in this respect to those
already present, then those with the highest expectation of bearing the burden
from increased welfare costs may be particularly concerned about immigration
from Asia and the West Indies. The incidence of the ￿scal consequences of
higher welfare dependency will depend on whether the greater cost is met by
raising taxes or by cutting public expenditure and on how exactly this is done.
In principle, the cost could fall on the rich or poor, but if the increase is in
the most progressive aspects of the tax system, then it will be those on high
incomes who su⁄er most (Fetzer 2000, Dustmann and Preston 2005, Facchini
and Mayda 2006).
3.2 The British Social Attitude Survey
Our attitudinal data is drawn from seven years of the British Social Attitudes
Survey (BSA)(1983, 1984, 1985, 1986, 1987, 1989, 1990). This gives us an eight
year period over which key questions were repeatedly asked in a form which
remained unchanged. Later years of the BSA ask questions on immigration
less regularly, and in a form which is not consistent from year to year. We
use the data for England and concentrate on white respondents only.11 There
are three sets of variables which we use for our analysis. First, questions on
attitudes to further immigration. Second, questions that are related to the
three underlying channels by which immigration preferences may be a⁄ected.
And third, questions that re￿ ect heterogeneity across individuals in preferences
due to individual and context characteristics. We describe these variables
brie￿ y below.
11Racial identity is self-assessed. Attitudes of ethnic minority individuals towards their
own communities, or towards other ethnic minorities, are likely to be driven by di⁄erent
mechanisms. While it might be interesting to investigate their attitudes, the sample sizes
within the BSA become very small when considering attitudes of minorities only.
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ions about immigration from di⁄erent origin countries. As discussed above,
distinctions are drawn between immigration from the West Indies, from India
and Pakistan, from other countries in the European common market, and from
New Zealand and Australia. We create binary variables for all these responses.
In Appendix D, we report the full wording of the original questions and some
summary statistics.
We decompose these attitudes into the three factors we have discussed
above, using the methodology we describe in section 2. For that purpose, we
use an array of questions which are speci￿c to each of the suggested underlying
channels that a⁄ect attitudes to immigration. As we discuss earlier, questions
related to labour market concerns include fear of job loss, perception of job
security, perceived ease of ￿nding a new job, and expectations of wage growth.
Questions related to welfare concerns cover opinions on generosity of bene￿ts,
needs of welfare recipients, and willingness to pay higher taxes to expand
welfare provision. Finally, questions related to race consist of opinions on
inter-ethnic marriage, acceptability of an ethnic minority superior at work,
and self rated prejudice against minorities. Again, the exact wording of the
questions and summary statistics are given in Appendix D.
Not all of these questions were asked in every year. The number of responses
to each question in each year that can be used is summarised in Appendix B
in table B1, where usability is determined by availability of data on both
regressors and dependent variables. In our estimation procedures, we make
maximum use of the available data. All observations covered in table B1 are
used.
The survey does not allow us to distinguish between foreign born and na-
tive born respondents. We do however observe ethnicity. We exclude ethnic
minority individuals from our analysis. Respondents therefore still include the
white foreign born. For the UK, and over the period we consider, this pop-
ulation forms only a small part of the overall population (3.8 percent). We
demonstrate below that this would, even for an extreme scenario of radically
di⁄erent attitudes of this group, hardly a⁄ect our empirical results.
The survey has extensive socioeconomic information on respondents, in-
cluding education, income, age, religion, and labour market status. The set of
variables in the matrix X above describe the individual￿ s own characteristics,
like their income situation, labour market characteristics, education, age, sex,
and religious beliefs, and variables that describe the individual￿ s environment,
like the local unemployment rate, and minority concentrations. In table 2 we
report summary statistics on these variables.
The two variables describing the characteristics of the local area of residence
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Variables Mean StdD
Unemployment rate, County level 0.0437 0.0203
Ethnic minority concentration, County 0.0262 0.0285
Rank in Income Distribution 0.5008 0.2877
Manual worker 0.4555 0.4980
Ever Unemployed 0.1687 0.3745
Ever Long Term Unemployed 0.0609 0.2392
Female 0.5368 0.4986
High Education Level 0.1017 0.3022
Low Education Level 0.4991 0.5000
Age 45.936 17.706
Catholic 0.1005 0.3007
No religion 0.3462 0.4757
are the unemployment rate and the concentration of ethnic minorities. The
former is based on yearly district level unemployment statistics. The latter
is interpolated from ward level census data for 1981 and 1991. We aggregate
both of these variables to the county level to minimise endogeneity issues
arising from location choice (see Dustmann and Preston, 2001, for a discussion
of endogenous location).12
The household income variable is reported in banded form in the data.
Rather than calculating a continuous measure in units of income, we have
computed the average percentile point of households in that band in the income
distribution, for the speci￿c year in which the individual is interviewed. When
thinking about the e⁄ect of income on attitudes, we have in mind the e⁄ect of
the relative position of the individual in the income distribution, rather than
some absolute income measure. Our de￿nition of household income seems
therefore quite natural in this context.
The individual characteristics we include in X consist of variables that are
likely to re￿ ect di⁄erences in attitude to further immigration. Age is likely
to a⁄ect attitudes for several reasons. First, it is a direct measure of life ex-
perience. Second, it marks the position of the individual in their economic
cycle. Finally, the age variable captures cohort e⁄ects. We have added two
variables on religious beliefs, re￿ ecting whether the individual is Catholic or
not religious. Attitudes may be in￿ uenced both by the high weight placed by
12County is an administrative unit, covering on average 1.27 million people, and corre-
sponding plausibly to a local labour market.
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All Manual Non High Medium Low
Manual Ed. Ed. Ed.
West Indian 66.46 69.48 65.56 50.45 55.05 70.36
Asian 70.58 75.08 68.46 50.36 68.90 75.61
European 46.21 51.19 43.19 30.80 44.91 50.09
Australians, New Zealand 33.19 34.63 32.96 27.17 35.38 33.62
Response variable: 1 if prefers less settlement of respective population group.
Respondents: white.
many religions on the virtue of tolerance, but also by any tendencies to par-
ticularism that may be associated with speci￿c creeds. It is also possible that
religious a¢ liation may re￿ ect historic experiences of persecution or current
feelings of marginality (Fetzer, 2000) of particular groups of the population.
We also include dummy variables indicating whether the individual has ever
been unemployed, either in the short or long term, and is female. Finally,
as context variables, we include the local unemployment rate and the local
concentration of ethnic minorities.
We classify people according to whether they are manual or non-manual
workers. Furthermore, we distinguish between three education categories. We
allocate individuals to the high education category if they remained in educa-
tion beyond age 18, and to the low education category if they did not remain
in school beyond either age 15 or the compulsory school leaving age (whichever
is earlier).
4 Descriptive Results
4.1 Attitudes by Country of Origin
We now turn to the variables on responses to the questions regarding further
immigration. The ability to distinguish between responses from immigrant
populations that di⁄er in ethnicity from the majority population is a partic-
ular strength of our data. In table 3, we report mean responses, where we
distinguish between di⁄erent education groups, and manual and non-manual
workers.
The numbers in the table show quite dramatic di⁄erences in responses ac-
cording to the origin of potential immigrants. About two in three respondents
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in the table), while about one in two opposes settlement of European immi-
grants, and one in three settlement of Australians and New Zealanders. These
numbers suggest that opposition to further immigration increases with ethnic
and cultural distance.
The next columns distinguish attitudes by breaking down respondents ac-
cording to whether they are manual or non-manual workers, and their educa-
tion status. Manual workers have a slightly more negative attitude towards all
immigrant groups than non-manual workers. Across education groups, there
is a clear tendency towards support for a more restrictionist immigration pol-
icy, the lower the educational background of the respondent. For all potential
immigrant populations, the same pattern is evident, with preferences towards
further immigration becoming more supportive, the less ethnically di⁄erent
the immigrant population. For Australians and New Zealanders, there is no
majority of respondents in any group favouring less settlement.
If respondents were only to consider economic reasons in formation of their
attitudes, we should on average expect that any di⁄erences in responses across
groups re￿ ect the perceived di⁄erences in the impact di⁄erent groups have on
the UK economy and labour market. Considering tables 1 and 3, there seems
to be con￿ icting evidence in the data for this hypothesis. On the one side,
the higher opposition of the low educated to immigration from Asia and the
West Indies than from Australia/New Zealand seems in line with individuals
from the ￿rst two groups having higher fractions of low educated, and thus
possibly posing the strongest threat in the labour market. On the other hand,
Australians/New Zealanders have the highest percentage of highly educated
individuals, and should be perceived as a particular threat to highly educated
natives, while individuals from the Indian subcontinent should pose the least
threat. Nevertheless, the percentage of highly educated that opposes immi-
gration from Australia/Asia is 23 percentage points lower than that opposing
further immigration from the Indian subcontinent. The numbers in table 1
show also that di⁄erent immigrant groups also have di⁄ering propensities to
claim bene￿ts, with, for example, higher proportions of those of West Indian
and Asian origin claiming unemployment bene￿t. If the e⁄ect on costliness of
the bene￿t system leads to higher tax rates (rather than cuts in bene￿t lev-
els) then under a re-distributive tax and bene￿t system, it would be the more
highly educated who would bear the major burden of this (see Dustmann and
Preston, 2006 for a fuller discussion), providing perhaps one explanation for
the di⁄erence in attitudes.
15
Dustmann and Preston: Racial and Economic Factors in Attitudes to Immigration
Published by The Berkeley Electronic Press, 2007Table 4: Disapproval of Further Immigration
Variable Less Less Less Less Aust.,
Variable West Indian Asian European N.Z.
Coe⁄ t-ratio Coe⁄ t-ratio Coe⁄ t-ratio Coe⁄ t-ratio
Compulsory 0.035 1.63 0.055 2.57 0.040 1.81 0.005 0.25
Ed.
High Ed. -0.149 -4.85 -0.160 -5.62 -0.131 -3.81 -0.109 -3.27
Level
Income 0.090 2.48 0.068 1.99 0.015 0.38 0.047 1.29
Rank
Manual 0.014 0.67 0.036 1.80 0.047 2.17 0.011 0.53
Worker
Ever -0.012 -0.43 0.000 0.00 -0.005 -0.19 0.011 0.44
Unemployed
Ever L.T. 0.018 0.39 -0.019 -0.43 0.008 0.18 -0.053 -1.25
Unemployed
Female -0.003 -0.14 -0.004 -0.23 0.019 0.95 0.005 0.29
Age 0.576 2.26 0.294 1.21 1.234 4.66 1.653 6.39
Age2 -0.256 -0.96 -0.096 -0.39 -1.074 -3.97 -1.873 -7.05
Unemployed -0.225 -0.47 -0.515 -1.12 0.397 0.77 -0.265 -0.55
Rate
Ethnic Min. -0.002 -0.01 0.137 0.50 0.203 0.64 0.294 1.01
Conc.
Catholic -0.063 -2.26 -0.073 -2.58 -0.024 -0.76 -0.028 -0.91
No religion 0.008 0.43 -0.009 -0.47 0.014 0.71 0.026 1.38
Sample size 4624 4650 4638 4644
Marginal e⁄ects from probit models, evaluated at sample means.
All estimations include time dummies.
4.2 Attitudes and Individual Characteristics
Before turning to a more structural analysis in the next section, we establish
as a next step the relationship between the various immigration questions and
respondents￿individual characteristics, as well as regressors which characterise
the respondent￿ s environment. Means of the variables are given in table 2.
These regressions are similar to those presented in other papers, like Scheve
and Slaughter (2001). In table 4, we report marginal e⁄ects, evaluated at the
sample mean. The reported coe¢ cients on binary variables are the di⁄erences
in probabilities between the groups for which the binary variable takes the
value unity and the base group.
Of particular interest are the education variables. Intermediate education
is the excluded group. Overall, our estimates indicate that the more edu-
16
The B.E. Journal of Economic Analysis & Policy, Vol. 7 [2007], Iss. 1 (Advances), Art. 62
http://www.bepress.com/bejeap/vol7/iss1/art62cated are more favourable towards further immigration than those with an
intermediate level of education, while the low educated are slightly more un-
favourable. These ￿ndings are in line with those of others (for example Scheve
and Slaughter, 2001, Bauer, Lofstrom and Zimmermann, 2001, Hanson, Scheve
and Slaughter, 2005, Mayda, 2005 and Citrin, Green, Muste and Wong, 1997).
But our results also indicate that the origin of the potential immigrant pop-
ulation may relate to the way views on further immigration are formed, and
that these di⁄er across education groups. While the highly educated are on
average 16 percentage points less likely to be in favour of restrictive immigra-
tion policies towards immigrants from Asia (as compared to individuals with
intermediate education), this reduces to 15 points for immigrants from the
West Indies, to 13 for immigration from Europe, and to 11 for immigration
from Australia and New Zealand. Similarly, when comparing individuals in the
lowest education category with individuals with intermediate education, the
sharpest di⁄erences are for immigration from Asia, while there are no di⁄er-
ences in preferences regarding immigration from Australia and New Zealand.
Taking the point estimates at face value, this suggests that the association of
education with attitudes towards further immigration changes with the degree
of cultural and ethnic distance of the prospective immigrant population, with
di⁄erences being largest across education groups for the most ethnically di⁄er-
ent groups. This could be partly explained by labour market concerns. Given
the educational distribution of the four immigrant groups presented above, a
labour market model would suggest that the highly educated should be more
opposed to further immigration from Australia/New Zealand than to Asia or
the West Indies, compared to the lower educated. However, the magnitude of
di⁄erences between Europeans on the one side and Asians/West Indians on
the other, seems to be far larger than what the di⁄erences in skills (see table
1) would suggest.
Interesting also are the coe¢ cients of the income measure, which is the
rank of the individual in the income distribution in that particular year. No-
tice that the coe¢ cients we report are conditional on education, thus isolating
the pure association of the rank in the income distribution with attitudes. The
estimates suggest that individuals in higher quantiles of the income distribu-
tion are more opposed to further immigration, particularly so from the West
Indies and Asia.13 The higher welfare dependence of West Indians and Asians
as compared to Europeans and Australians/New Zealanders, as illustrated in
table 1, is compatible with the relative magnitude of this variable across immi-
13Alternatively, we used an absolute measure of income rather than percentile ranges, and
results are very similar.
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be expected if those bearing a higher burden of any imagined tax consequences
were more opposed to immigration, suggesting that such considerations may
play an important role when forming attitudes towards further immigration.
Thus, conclusions one could base on these empirical ￿ndings are similar in
nature to those of Facchini and Mayda (2006).
Corresponding probit models for the ten questions used to identify the three
channels (the variables that underlie the vector z￿ in our notation above) are
reported in tables B3-B5 of Appendix B. In Appendix D we provide the
exact wording of the questions and the frequency of responses (tables D1-D9).
In table B6 we report the estimated residual correlations. Entries in that
table correspond to the estimated matrix ￿￿. We see that attitudes towards
immigration from di⁄erent sources are indeed highly correlated and especially
so between attitudes towards West Indian and Asian immigration. Answers to
the ten indicator questions are clearly more strongly correlated within blocks
than between, in accordance with the model to be ￿tted. Finally, attitudes
to immigration are correlated with answers to the indicator questions, though
most strongly so in the case of racial and cultural attitudes, and least so in
the case of labour market concerns. In terms of the model to be applied these
correlations re￿ ect both the strength of association between the latent factors
and attitudes to immigration, ￿, and the reliability of the auxiliary questions
as indicators of the factors, M. In order to separate these and to focus on the
parameters of interest in ￿, we therefore turn now to the results of ￿tting the
model to these residual correlations.
5 Results
5.1 Attitudes and Economic, Welfare and Cultural Con-
cerns
We now present results from estimating the association between the three
channels of concern we have discussed above and immigration attitudes. We
￿rst show results we obtain for the full sample. We then split the sample
according to skill and educational groups. These results are discussed further
below. We report the estimates of the parameters in ￿ in table 5.14 The
underlying probit estimates are reported in Appendix B.
14Equally weighted minimum distance estimates are reported in Appendix E and are very
similar.
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Variable Labour Market Welfare Culture/Race diag(￿u)
Coe⁄ t-ratio Coe⁄ t-ratio Coe⁄ t-ratio Coe⁄
West Indian 0.057 2.23 0.064 2.90 0.167 11.02 0.680
Asian 0.052 2.09 0.072 3.27 0.178 11.36 0.577
European 0.049 1.60 0.051 2.07 0.048 3.19 0.953
Aust.,N.Z. 0.042 1.53 0.033 1.44 0.001 0.10 0.984
Test1 ￿2
32 = 39.713 P-value = 0.164
Test2 ￿2
60 = 63.592 P-value = 0.351
The reported parameters are MDE estimates of the matrix ￿ as in (1), scaled to give e⁄ects
on probabilities of expressing hostile attitudes. Estimates are conditional on variables
re￿ecting county unemployment rate and minority ethnic concentration, income, manual
status, unemployment history, sex, education, age and religion.
Restrictions imposed: ￿22 = ￿w + M ￿v M0, ￿12 = ￿￿v M0
The coe¢ cient estimates in the table can be interpreted as the associa-
tion between each of the three channels of concern and attitudes to further
immigration from any of the four origin regions. As we point out above, the
estimates are reported as e⁄ects of a one standard deviation change in the
latent factor on the probability of hostility from the given source. They are
therefore comparable across rows and columns in magnitudes, allowing assess-
ment of the relative strength of each of the factors in determining attitudes to
further immigration. Note that, as we implicitly regress on all the individual
and context characteristics we discussed above, the estimates are conditional
estimates, netting out compositional di⁄erences across correspondents. Thus,
we eliminate possible spurious correlation through omission of, for example,
employment status or education.
As we point out in section 2, the parameters in M and ￿ are identi￿ed from
the reduced form matrices of estimated residuals, ￿12 and ￿22, imposing the
restrictions ￿22 = ￿w+M ￿v M0 and ￿12 = ￿￿v M0. There are considerable
overidenti￿cation restrictions involved, and we can test for those. In the tables,
we report tests on three sets of restrictions. Test1 is a test of ￿22 = ￿w +
M ￿v M0. This tests whether the correlations between indicator questions in
di⁄erent blocks can be accounted for fully through the factors and the cross-
factor correlations in ￿v. This test can be seen as a test of the structure we
impose on the M-matrix, in that sets of indicator questions in z relate each to
only one of the three factors with correlations in o⁄-diagonal blocks captured
through ￿v.
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tests additionally the restriction that the correlations between questions on
immigration and the indicator questions can be fully accounted for through the
hypothesised reduced dimensional factor structure. The test statistics are ￿2
distributed, with degrees of freedom determined by the number of restrictions
imposed. In the tables we report the p-values of these tests.
Before we interpret the parameters of immediate interest, represented by
the matrix ￿ above, we would ￿rst like to draw attention to the intermediate
coe¢ cients of the matrix M, which we report in Appendix C. These suggest
that the correlations between indicator questions zi determine each channel of
concern with a high degree of precision and plausible magnitudes. The test
statistic Test1 shows, furthermore, that the restrictions that correlations be-
tween indicator questions in di⁄erent blocks can be accounted for fully through
the factor structure and the cross-factor correlations in ￿v, are comfortably
accepted.
Turning to ￿, the numbers in table 5 show sizeable associations between
attitudes to further immigration and both labour market concerns as well
as welfare concerns. In fact, welfare concerns seem to be slightly larger in
magnitude than labour market concerns in in￿ uencing overall attitudes to im-
migration, for each of the immigrant groups considered, emphasising the im-
portance of this channel in attitudes to further immigration. Across di⁄erent
immigrant groups, the point estimates for labour market concerns seem to be
slightly larger for West Indian and Asian immigrants than for New Zealan-
ders/Australians and Europeans; however, di⁄erences in parameters are never
signi￿cant. Welfare concerns are more relevant when forming attitudes towards
further immigration from the West Indies and Asia, which is compatible with
the numbers on welfare receipt we have displayed in tables 3.
Racial and cultural prejudice seems to play a strong role in attitudes to
immigration from the West Indies and Asia, though less so for Europeans and
not at all for New Zealanders/Australians. For West Indians and Asians, the
two groups that are ethnically most distant from the respondent population,
this seems to be the strongest channel through which preferences for further
immigration are formed. This suggests that the sizeable di⁄erences in attitudes
to further immigration that we have illustrated in the simple descriptives in
table 3 are largely driven by this particular channel.
The ￿gures in the last column, headed diag(￿u), can be interpreted as the
proportion of the residual variance regarding attitudes to immigration from the
source in question which is not associated with any of the factors, conditional
on observables in X. Thus, 1 ￿ diag(￿u) has an interpretation not dissimilar
to the partial R2 in a regression context. For immigration from the more
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remains unaccounted for in terms of the factor model. For immigration from
Australia and New Zealand, almost all remains unaccounted for.
Finally, we note that estimation of ￿ implies additional overidentifying re-
strictions over and above those required to estimate M, and that these are
very easily accepted at usual signi￿cance levels. This o⁄ers important corrob-
orating evidence for the approach taken since the restrictions are substantial
(see Test2).
Equation (2) relates individual characteristics to the di⁄erent channels we
consider. The parameters in B would be interesting, as they measure the
importance of individual characteristics in explaining variation of the three
channels. If we were willing to assume C = 0 then we would have ￿2 = BM
and an estimate of B could be readily calculated. Such a restriction is, however,
heavily rejected.
5.2 Skill and Education Groups
Our discussion above suggests that individuals in di⁄erent sectors of the labour
market, or of di⁄erent skill levels, may have reasons to view immigration dif-
ferently. It has often been argued that manual workers, as well as less skilled
workers, are more vulnerable to low skilled immigration (Borjas, 1999b). If im-
migration is perceived as being mainly low skilled, then one might expect that
this would show up in a di⁄erence in the factors driving attitudes of workers
in distinct labour market segments.
Our simple summary statistics on the attitudinal responses, split across
di⁄erent labour market groups (see table 3), indicate that attitudes towards
further immigration tend to be less favourable among manual than non-manual
workers; furthermore, preference for more immigration increases with educa-
tional background. Although our analysis above takes account of variables
describing these segments by incorporating them as regressors, we now es-
timate separate systems for the di⁄erent groups. The restrictions imposed
di⁄er in allowing all coe¢ cients of the ￿ matrix to vary between population
subgroups.15
15The restrictions imposed are ￿22i = ￿w + M ￿v M0 and ￿12i = M ￿v ￿0
i, where i
corresponds to the subgroups (for example, manual and non-manual).
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Manual, Labour Force Only
Variable Labour Market Welfare Culture/Race diag(￿u)
Coe⁄ t-ratio Coe⁄ t-ratio Coe⁄ t-ratio Coe⁄
Non-Manual
West Indian 0.058 1.51 0.079 1.97 0.160 5.56 0.700
Asian 0.064 1.90 0.099 2.37 0.182 5.63 0.567
European 0.060 1.45 0.040 1.05 0.046 1.65 0.950
Aust.,N.Z. 0.066 1.68 -0.001 -0.03 0.036 1.13 0.958
Manual
West Indian 0.025 0.55 0.005 0.11 0.186 4.77 0.739
Asian 0.021 0.41 0.000 0.00 0.229 5.41 0.590
European 0.004 0.09 0.019 0.43 0.058 1.83 0.970
Aust.,N.Z. -0.023 -0.54 0.027 0.59 -0.008 -0.27 0.989
Test1 ￿2
77 = 77.334 P-value = 0.468
Test2 ￿2
133 =125.915 P-value = 0.656
The reported parameters are MDE estimates of the matrix ￿ estimated separately for manual
and non-manual workers.
The restrictions imposed are: ￿22i = ￿w + M ￿v M0, ￿12i = ￿i ￿v M0
Manual and non-manual workers
We report results of the coe¢ cients in ￿i for manual and non-manual workers
in Table 6.16 The upper panel reports results for non-manual workers, and
the lower panel for manual workers. The sample is restricted to those in the
labour force for this table.
The results show that labour market concerns and welfare concerns appear
to be important for non-manual workers, with welfare concerns being slightly
stronger than labour market concerns in forming preferences to further immi-
gration from the West Indies and Asia. Again, if non-manual workers carry
the larger part of the welfare burden of a re-distributive tax system, then this
is compatible with higher welfare receipt of these groups of immigrants as seen
in table 1, to which these workers may react particularly sensitively. Labour
market concerns seem to be roughly of equal importance across the di⁄erent
groups of potential immigrants.
The association of preferences for further immigration with racial or cul-
16The test statistic Test2 indicates that the restrictions imposed are clearly accepted.
These now include not only the restrictions imposed in earlier sections applied to each
group but also the restriction of common M and ￿v matrices in the di⁄erent groups.
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higher magnitude to welfare concerns. For Europeans on the other hand, the
association of overall attitude to immigration with racial or cultural prejudice
is similar in magnitude to labour market and welfare concerns. For Australians
and New Zealanders, only labour market concerns seem to play a role.
The lower panel shows results for manual workers. Here, labour market
and welfare concerns seem to be unimportant channels for the formation of
attitudes to further immigration, while racial or cultural prejudice remains
strong, in particular for attitudes towards further immigration from Asia and
the West Indies; it is less important for Europe, and vanishes for Australia/New
Zealand.
The contrast between the two groups is notable: while welfare and labour
market concerns seem to have a negligible impact on the opinions of manual
workers towards any of the immigrant populations, they are a strong factor
for non-manual workers. It may be that economic competition from potential
immigrants is perceived most strongly by the higher skilled. This is in line
with the skill structure of immigrants to the UK, as illustrated in table 1,
with a higher percentage of degree holders among the foreign born minority
groups. This is also compatible with empirical ￿ndings by Dustmann, Fab-
bri and Preston (2005) on the impact of immigration, where workers with
intermediate skills are the only group for which there is clear evidence of an
employment response to immigration. Alternatively, the strong presence of
racial and cultural concerns for manual workers may be an indication that the
opinion formation process is based on simpler prejudicial perceptions rather
than more elaborate opinions about the impact or consequences of immigra-
tion. To further investigate these issues, we now split up the sample into three
education groups.
Low, medium, and high education
In table 7 we report results where we distinguish between three education
groups (low education, medium education, and high education) according to
the age at which the respondent left full time education.17 The top panel
reports results for the highly educated, the middle panel for individuals with
intermediate education, and the lower panel for individuals with low education.
The di⁄erences across these groups, in terms of the importance of the three
channels in relating to preferences over further immigration, is quite striking.
For the highly educated, the quantitatively most important channel and the
17The high P-value on the test statistic Test2 indicates again that the restrictions of
common M and ￿v matrices in the di⁄erent groups are comfortably accepted.
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Variable Labour Market Welfare Culture/Race diag(￿u)
Coe⁄ t-ratio Coe⁄ t-ratio Coe⁄ t-ratio Coe⁄
High Education
West Indian 0.185 2.06 0.232 2.66 0.135 2.15 0.142
Asian 0.176 2.21 0.222 2.69 0.129 2.35 0.019
European 0.181 1.59 0.190 1.95 0.004 0.05 0.696
Aust., N.Z. 0.124 1.26 0.140 1.60 ￿ 0.007 -0.12 0.822
Medium Education
West Indian 0.058 1.11 0.099 2.13 0.144 4.42 0.663
Asian 0.045 0.96 0.109 2.65 0.139 5.04 0.574
European 0.070 1.04 0.089 1.69 0.041 1.31 0.921
Aust., N.Z. 0.068 1.10 -0.017 0.36 0.026 0.90 0.962
Low Education
West Indian 0.029 0.76 0.019 0.56 0.174 8.18 0.712
Asian 0.023 0.57 0.022 0.66 0.182 7.85 0.604
European 0.024 0.48 0.018 0.53 0.057 2.91 0.972
Aust., N.Z. 0.018 0.42 0.027 0.80 0.008 -0.41 0.995
Test1 ￿2
122 = 81.372 P-value = 0.998
Test2 ￿2
206 = 158.596 P-value = 0.994
The reported parameters are MDE estimates of the matrix ￿ estimated separately by
education group.
Restrictions imposed: ￿22i = ￿w + M ￿v M0, ￿12i = ￿i ￿v M0
statistically best-determined seems to be welfare concerns. These indeed play
a particularly strong role for immigrants from the West Indies and Asia, which,
since these groups have the highest welfare dependence, is in line with what
might be expected under a redistributive system of welfare and taxation, where
consequences of further immigration are ￿nanced through tax changes. There
is strong evidence also of labour market concerns being important, with slight
di⁄erences in point estimates across groups.
Racial and cultural concerns also matter, but only for the West Indians
and Asians, and less so than the other two issues. However, the contribution
of this last channel may explain the pattern for the highly educated that we
discussed in table 3.
In sharp contrast is the relative importance of these three channels for
the low educated. As it appears from the numbers in the table, the labour
market channel and the welfare channel seem to be much less important in the
formation of preferences to further immigration. However, racial and cultural
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While largest for immigration from the West Indies and Asia, this channel
is also relevant to European immigration, but vanishes for Australians/New
Zealanders.
The low importance individuals in the lowest education group attach to
the welfare channels is again compatible with a re-distributive system where
most of the welfare burden is borne by the highest educated. Similarly, the
lower weight these individuals attach to the labour market channel may be in
line with the educational distribution of immigrants in the UK, which does not
clearly indicate that the competitive pressure for one group or another should
increase.
Individuals in the medium education category have an intermediate posi-
tion on these aspects. Labour market concerns are much weaker and statis-
tically insigni￿cant, but welfare concerns retain a strongly determined role,
albeit one now weaker than racial and cultural concerns. Interesting again is
the pattern in welfare concerns where point estimates are larger for the two
groups that are indeed highest in their welfare dependence when considering
unemployment bene￿ts. As for the highly educated and the low educated,
cultural and race concerns are strong for those immigrant groups that are
ethnically most distant from the majority population.
The clearest ￿nding among these results from an economic point of view is
the importance of considering welfare concerns as a possible channel in deter-
mining preferences for further immigration. Overall, our ￿ndings are compat-
ible throughout with the perception of a redistributive welfare system, where
the better o⁄ expect to bear the burden of immigration with high welfare de-
pendence. The common expectation that low preference towards immigration
amongst the least skilled and least educated is driven by economic concerns
does not seem to be supported by our ￿ndings. In fact, our results indicate
that it is the views of the most educated that are most in￿ uenced by economic
factors. However, these results are not at odds with the particular skill struc-
ture of immigrants to the UK - where immigrants are relatively well educated
compared to the majority population - which is in sharp contrast to the US
or some continental European countries (see table 1). Finally, from a broader
perspective, our estimates show that racial and cultural concerns are of ma-
jor importance for attitudes to further immigration, and that these concerns
are the largest driver of preferences to further immigration for low education
groups.
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It is commonly argued that immigration may lead to job displacement of native
workers and that immigrants may be a burden on welfare and public services.
If these views are shared by large numbers of the public then (independently
of whether they are justi￿ed) such concerns may be an important component
of aversion towards further immigration. If these considerations contribute
towards opinions on migration issues, then policies related to labour market
security and welfare spending may have important secondary e⁄ects on public
opinion about and resistance towards further immigration. By way of contrast,
if preferences over further immigration are also rooted in racial or cultural
concerns, then they may be less responsive to more economic interventions.
This paper attempts to assess the importance of welfare and labour mar-
ket concerns, as well as racially or culturally inclined considerations, for the
formation of opinions towards further immigration. Our analysis by way of
distinguishing responses between di⁄erent immigrant groups that are hetero-
geneous in terms of welfare dependence, skill distribution, as well as ethnic
distance from the respondent group, gives us an additional variation which
helps identify whether respondents consider the suggested channels as relevant.
Furthermore, our approach estimates the importance of these three possible
channels of attitude formation directly, thus allowing us direct assessment of
relative magnitude and importance for each of the di⁄erent immigrant groups
as well as respondent groups. Our results are interesting in several respects.
First, we do ￿nd strong evidence that welfare concerns are associated with
opinion towards further immigration, where associations work largely in a way
that would be expected from a model where immigration of individuals with
higher welfare dependence is thought to be felt more by the better-o⁄. Thus,
our analysis supports our ￿ndings elsewhere (Dustmann and Preston, 2005)
that suggest welfare concerns are most relevant when individuals assess the
overall impact immigration has on the economy. Our results are also compati-
ble with recent work by Hanson, Scheve and Slaughter (2006) and Facchini and
Mayda (2006), who likewise establish welfare concern as an important channel
in determining preferences over further immigration. Both papers, though us-
ing a di⁄erent approach (by utilising spatial variation in immigrant skill ratios
or immigrant dependency ratios), come to similar conclusions as our study,
suggesting perceived welfare e⁄ects where the better-o⁄ carry the burden of
increases in dependency ratios arising from immigration.
Our analysis also isolates cultural and racial concerns as an important
channel that is associated with opinion towards further immigration. For all
skill and education groups, this channel is similar in magnitude, and more
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majority population. Work by Scheve and Slaughter (2001) and Mayda (2005)
has established the importance of non-economic factors in attitude formation.
The analysis in this paper emphasises these suggestions, and shows a clear
association with proposed immigrant origin groups.
A ￿nal interesting ￿nding is perhaps that there is no strong evidence that
the greater labour market concerns sometimes believed to exist among un-
skilled and manual workers are re￿ ected in opposition towards further immi-
gration. However, labour market concerns are an important channel for pref-
erence towards immigration among the better educated. This may be related
to the speci￿c skill composition of immigrants in the UK, where the immigrant
population is, if at all much di⁄erent, better educated than the native white
population.
Appendix A Estimation
We estimate the reduced form in a two stage procedure to obtain estimates of ￿
and ￿￿. We estimate ￿ by a series of independent (ordered) probits. We then
estimate the components of ￿￿ by pairwise bivariate Maximum Likelihood,
conditional upon the estimated probit coe¢ cients. Not all of the questions
used are asked in every year of our sample, but there is su¢ cient overlap to
identify all reduced form parameters.
This estimation procedure is similar to that suggested by MuthØn (1984)
or by Browne and Arminger (1995). Our derivation of the variance-covariance
matrix for the estimates draws on the arguments of MuthØn and Satorra (1995).
Let ￿1 denote the vector of parameters estimated by independent ordered
probits in the ￿rst stage (which is to say the vector of the elements of ￿) and let
￿2 denote the vector of parameters estimated by pairwise bivariate likelihood
maximisation at the second stage (which is to say the vector of all generically




2)0 denote the vector of
all reduced form parameters.
Let li(￿) denote a vector of the same dimensions as ￿, the elements of
which are the log likelihood contributions of the ith respondent to estimation
of the corresponding elements of ￿. Note that di⁄erent likelihoods are used to
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By the Mean Value Theorem
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so that we can consistently estimate V and the block lower triangular matrix
A by taking the outer products of gradients indicated. We can thereby con-
sistently estimate the asymptotic variance-covariance matrix of the estimates
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itive semide￿niteness of the estimated asymptotic variance-covariance matrix
for the parameter estimates ^ ￿ (see Appendix A for derivation). In practice,
we ￿nd ^ ￿ to have a few small negative eigenvalues. It can therefore not be
used as the weighting matrix. We chose as an alternative weighting matrix the
diagonal matrix dg(^ ￿) containing the diagonal elements of ^ ￿.18 Since this is
not the optimal weighting matrix the minimised value of the criterion does not
give the standard ￿2 test of the restrictions so we use the formula in Newey
(1985).19
Appendix B First Step Probit Results
Table B1: Sample Sizes by Year
Variables 83 84 85 86 87 89 90 Total
Less West Indian 1140 1051 757 883 804 4635
Less Asian 1156 1060 756 885 804 4661
Less European 1151 1056 756 883 803 4649
Less Aust, N.Z. 1155 1058 754 882 806 4655
Marriage 1186 1113 833 1015 4147
Boss 1199 1117 850 1022 4188
Prejudice 1218 1118 1185 1615 1945 2085 897 10063
Job Loss 1221 1132 1193 1631 2094 1793 9064
Find Job 652 652
Wage Exp 596 578 600 846 976 1058 918 5572
Job Security 590 590
Bene￿ts 1149 1052 1121 1545 1849 1943 1641 10300
Need 923 1820 2743
More spending 924 1825 2749
18Another idea would be to use the positive semi-de￿nite matrix obtained from ^ ￿ by
replacing the negative eigenvalues by zeros in the spectral decomposition. We found this to
give very unstable results.
19Bearing in mind the small-sample concerns raised by Altonji and Segal (1996), we also
calculate, for comparison, equally weighted minimum distance estimates using the identity
matrix as weighting matrix. These are very similar (see Appendix E).
29
Dustmann and Preston: Racial and Economic Factors in Attitudes to Immigration
Published by The Berkeley Electronic Press, 2007Table B2: Immigration Probits
Variable Less West Indian Less Asian Less European Less Aust., N.Z.
Coe⁄ t-ratio Coe⁄ t-ratio Coe⁄ t-ratio Coe⁄ t-ratio
Unemployment Rate -0.638 -0.47 -1.567 -1.12 0.997 0.77 -0.727 -0.55
Ethnic Minor. Conc. -0.005 -0.01 0.417 0.50 0.509 0.64 0.805 1.01
Income Rank 0.254 2.48 0.206 1.99 0.038 0.38 0.128 1.29
Manual Worker 0.040 0.67 0.110 1.80 0.119 2.17 0.030 0.53
Ever Unemployed -0.033 -0.43 0.000 0.00 -0.013 -0.19 0.031 0.44
Ever Long Term Unemp. 0.050 0.39 -0.058 -0.43 0.021 0.18 -0.145 -1.25
Female -0.008 -0.14 -0.012 -0.23 0.047 0.95 0.015 0.29
Compulsory Education 0.098 1.63 0.167 2.57 0.102 1.81 0.014 0.25
High Education Level -0.422 -4.85 -0.488 -5.62 -0.328 -3.81 -0.299 -3.27
Age 1.630 2.26 0.893 1.21 3.100 4.66 4.532 6.39
Age2 -0.724 -0.96 -0.291 -0.39 -2.698 -3.97 -5.135 -7.05
Catholic -0.179 -2.26 -0.223 -2.58 -0.060 -0.76 -0.076 -0.91
No Religion 0.024 0.43 -0.027 -0.47 0.036 0.71 0.072 1.38
Sample size 4624 4650 4638 4644
Table B3: Racial Attitude Probits
Variable Marriage Boss Prejudice
Coe⁄ t-ratio Coe⁄ t-ratio Coe⁄ t-ratio
Unemployment Rate 1.885 1.41 -0.153 -0.11 -0.962 -1.16
Ethnic Minor. Conc. 2.835 3.35 -0.081 -0.08 2.236 4.21
Income Rank 0.305 2.75 -0.015 -0.13 0.394 5.48
Manual Worker 0.078 1.44 -0.035 -0.50 -0.090 -2.28
Ever Unemployed -0.006 -0.08 0.016 0.20 0.083 1.51
Ever Long Term Unemp. -0.006 -0.05 0.125 0.85 -0.082 -0.94
Female 0.063 1.24 -0.127 -2.15 -0.200 -5.96
Compulsory Education 0.111 1.82 0.151 2.15 0.050 1.19
High Education Level -0.315 -3.30 -0.155 -1.31 -0.321 -5.10
Age/100 4.073 5.80 -1.790 -2.33 0.550 1.18
Age2/10000 -2.847 -3.99 2.231 2.85 -0.568 -1.20
Catholic -0.089 -1.11 -0.237 -2.21 -0.323 -5.35
No Religion -0.083 -1.42 0.051 0.80 0.002 0.06
Sample size 4143 4184 10049
Table B4: Job Attitudes Probits
Variable Job Loss Find Job Wage Job Security
Coe⁄ t-ratio Coe⁄ t-ratio Coe⁄ t-ratio Coe⁄ t-ratio
Unemployment Rate 0.096 0.08 14.849 3.91 3.132 3.31 -3.134 -0.77
Ethnic Minor. Conc. -0.058 -0.08 -2.171 -1.19 -1.788 -3.04 1.152 0.59
Income Rank -1.601 -15.05 -0.652 -2.95 -0.803 -8.24 -0.654 -2.47
Manual Worker 0.004 0.07 0.165 1.43 0.257 4.79 0.240 1.79
Ever Unemployed 0.021 0.29 0.167 1.02 0.001 0.01 1.055 6.22
Ever Long Term Unemp. 0.042 0.29 0.222 0.83 0.104 1.09 0.570 2.65
Female 0.341 6.39 -0.150 -1.44 0.333 6.57 -0.076 -0.64
Compulsory Education -0.044 -0.81 -0.080 -0.68 0.086 1.64 0.035 0.26
High Education Level 0.113 1.66 0.059 0.33 0.056 0.87 0.079 0.41
Age/100 -8.733 -8.89 3.618 1.86 1.983 2.60 1.888 0.65
Age2/10000 12.308 10.74 -1.065 -0.50 -1.415 -1.53 -0.585 -0.17
Catholic -0.044 -0.51 -0.064 -0.37 0.034 0.52 -0.072 -0.38
No Religion -0.072 -1.36 0.083 0.78 0.038 0.85 0.026 0.20
Sample size 9045 651 5566 589
30
The B.E. Journal of Economic Analysis & Policy, Vol. 7 [2007], Iss. 1 (Advances), Art. 62
http://www.bepress.com/bejeap/vol7/iss1/art62Table B5: Welfare Attitude Probits
Variable Bene￿ts Need More Spending
Coe⁄ t-ratio Coe⁄ t-ratio Coe⁄ t-ratio
Unemployment Rate -7.179 -7.31 -8.330 -6.11 -3.109 -2.19
Ethnic Minor. Conc. 0.866 1.49 1.878 2.22 -1.135 -1.39
Income Rank 0.458 4.98 0.175 1.46 0.618 5.56
Manual Worker -0.147 -3.26 0.072 1.09 -0.133 -2.25
Ever Unemployed -0.211 -3.18 -0.057 -0.63 -0.016 -0.17
Ever Long Term Unemp. -0.188 -1.44 -0.135 -1.11 -0.086 -0.66
Female 0.054 1.11 0.071 1.27 0.085 1.50
Compulsory Education 0.038 0.77 0.247 3.38 0.127 1.75
High Education Level -0.418 -6.01 -0.389 -3.73 -0.130 -1.42
Age/100 -0.921 -1.80 0.515 0.61 -1.667 -2.03
Age2/10000 2.034 3.95 0.633 0.73 1.170 1.39
Catholic -0.238 -3.54 -0.087 -1.07 -0.305 -3.51
No Religion -0.149 -3.33 -0.049 -0.77 -0.119 -1.95
Sample size 10282 2740 2746
Table B6: Residual Correlation Matrix
Variable Less West Less Less Less Marriage Boss Prejudice
Indian Asian European Aust./N.Z.
Less Asian 0.98 . . . . . .
Less European 0.83￿ 0.80￿ . . . . .
Less Aust./N.Z. 0.82￿ 0.78￿ 0.89￿ . . . .
Marriage 0.39￿ 0.45￿ 0.11￿ 0.01 . . .
Boss 0.41￿ 0.47￿ 0.10￿ 0.00 0.68￿ . .
Prejudice 0.46￿ 0.53￿ 0.17￿ 0.06 0.59￿ 0.64￿ .
Job Loss 0.01 -0.02 0.01 0.03 -0.01 -0.03 -0.01
Find Job 0.06 0.09 0.10 0.04 -0.01 0.07 0.01
Wage Exp 0.01 0.00 0.00 -0.01 -0.01 -0.04 -0.01
Job Security 0.14 0.15￿ 0.10 0.11 0.01 0.04 0.02
Bene￿ts 0.18￿ 0.22￿ 0.08￿ 0.04 0.13￿ 0.15￿ 0.15￿
Need 0.23￿ 0.27￿ 0.12￿ 0.04 0.17￿ 0.22￿ 0.22￿
More Spending 0.14￿ 0.19￿ 0.06 0.01 0.15￿ 0.13￿ 0.20￿
Variable Job Loss Find Job Wage Exp Job Bene￿ts Need
Security
Less Asian . . . . . .
Less European . . . . . .
Less Aust./N.Z. . . . . . .
Marriage . . . . . .
Boss . . . . . .
Prejudice . . . . . .
Job Loss . . . . . .
Find Job 0.16￿ . . . . .
Wage Exp 0.06 0.05 . . . .
Job Security 0.43￿ 0.25￿ 0.13 . . .
Bene￿ts -0.06 -0.22￿ -0.01 -0.20￿ . .
Need -0.12￿ -0.14￿ -0.03 -0.12 0.52￿ .
More Spending -0.01 -0.06 -0.09 -0.05 0.37￿ 0.34￿
￿: Signi￿cant at the 5% level. Entries are elements of the estimated ￿￿ matrix. Due to normalisation, these
can be interpreted as conditional correlation coe¢ cients after removing the e⁄ects of observable character-
istics of individuals.
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M and ￿
Table C1: MD Estimates of M and ￿v, All Respondents
M
Variable Jobs Welfare Race diag(￿w)
Coe⁄ t-ratio Coe⁄ t-ratio Coe⁄ t-ratio Coe⁄
Job Loss 0.475 5.57 ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ 0.774
Find Job 0.383 4.74 ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ 0.853
Wage 0.138 1.91 ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ 0.981
Job security 0.771 6.26 ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ 0.405
Bene￿ts ￿ ￿ 0.674 14.27 ￿ ￿ 0.546
Need ￿ ￿ 0.727 15.31 ￿ ￿ 0.472
More Spending ￿ ￿ 0.495 12.36 ￿ ￿ 0.755
Marriage ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ 0.762 17.39 0.420
Boss ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ 0.843 15.13 0.290
Prejudice ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ 0.783 17.91 0.387
￿v
Variable Jobs Welfare Race
Coe⁄ t-ratio Coe⁄ t-ratio Coe⁄ t-ratio
Jobs 1.000 - -0.284 -3.85 -0.003 -0.04
Welfare -0.284 -3.85 1.000 - 0.321 6.74
Race -0.003 -0.04 0.321 6.74 1.000 -
Restrictions imposed: ￿22 = ￿w + M ￿v M0
￿2
32 = 39.713 P-value = 0.164
The ￿gures in the last column of the uppermost table, headed diag(￿w), indicate the pro-
portion of the residual variance for the response in the question which is not attributable to
the relevant factor.
Appendix D Wording of the Questions
Table D1: Immigration Questions
Response West Indians Indians Common Market Australians and
and Pakistanis Countries (Europe) New Zealanders
more settlement,
about the same 34.79 31.06 55.29 68.01
less settlement 65.21 68.94 44.71 31.99
100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00
Wording of Question: Britain controls the number of people from abroad that are allowed to settle in this
country. Please say for each of the groups below whether you think Britain should allow more settlement,
less settlement, or about the same as now.
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Opposition to Opposition to
Response Marriage Boss
Not mind 48.09 81.11
Mind 51.91 18.89
100.00 100.00
Wording of Question: Opposition to Marriage: Do you think most people
in Britain would mind (or not mind) if one of their close relatives were to
marry a person of Asian / West Indian origin? ... and you personally?
Would you mind or not mind?
Opposition to Boss: Do you think most people in Britain would mind (or
not mind) if a suitably quali￿ed person of Asian / West Indian origin were
appointed as their boss? ... and you personally? Would you mind or not
mind?
Table D3: Racial Prejudice
Response
Not prejudiced at all 63.73
Very or a little prejudiced 36.27
100.00
Wording of Question: How would you de-
scribe yourself? As very prejudiced against
people of other races, a little prejudiced, or
not prejudiced at all?




Wording of Question: If employed: Think-
ing now about your own job, how likely (or
unlikely) is it that you will leave this employer
over the next year for any reason? ... Why do
you think you will leave?
People recorded as likely are those who an-
swered very likely or quite likely to the ￿rst
question and gave as reason ￿rm will close
down, I will be declared redundant, or my con-
tract of employment will expire.
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fairly di¢ cult 27.60
very di¢ cult 20.39
100.00
Wording of Question: If in paid job for 10
or more hours a week: If you lost your job for
any reason, and were looking actively for an-
other one, how easy, or di¢ cult, do you think
it would be for you to ￿nd an acceptable job?
If in paid job for less than 10 hours a week or
no paid job: If you were looking actively, how
easy, or di¢ cult, do you think it would be for
you to ￿nd an acceptable job?
Table D6: Wage Expectations
rise by more than cost of living 16.86
rise by same as cost of living 48.15
rise by less than cost of living 26.60
not rise at all 8.39
100.00
Wording of Question: If employee: If you
stay in this job, would you expect your wages
or salary over the coming year to ...







Wording of Question: If in paid work for
10 or more hours a week, please tick one box
to show how much you agree or disagree that
[this statement] applies to your job: My job is
secure.
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too low or neither 65.97
too high 34.03
100.00
Wording of Question: Opinions di⁄er about
the level of bene￿ts for the unemployed.
Which of these ... statements comes closest
to your own: Bene￿ts for the unemployed are
too low and cause hardship or Bene￿ts for the
unemployed are too high and discourage people
from ￿nding jobs.
In later years, people are allowed to agree to
both - in all years we categorise according to
whether people accept only the second state-
ment.
Table D9: Attitudes to Welfare
Responses Need More spending




strongly disagree 5.93 1.73
100.00 100.00
Wording of Question: Please tick one box
for each statement below to show how much
you agree or disagree with it.
Need: Many people who get social security do
not really deserve any help.
More Spending:The government should spend
more money on welfare bene￿ts for the poor,
even if it leads to higher taxes.
We reverse the answers to the ￿rst statement.
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Table 8: MDE Estimates of ￿, All Respondents
Variable Race Jobs Welfare diag(￿u)￿
Coe⁄ t-ratio Coe⁄ t-ratio Coe⁄ t-ratio Coe⁄
West Indian 0.459 10.55 0.181 2.25 0.191 2.76 0.680
Asian 0.523 10.51 0.201 2.42 0.239 3.12 0.571
European 0.106 2.71 0.153 1.90 0.147 2.17 0.946
Aust.,N.Z -0.003 -0.08 0.133 1.66 0.092 1.36 0.981
Test1 ￿2
32 = 40.109 P-value = 0.154
Test2 ￿2
60 = 62.348 P-value = 0.393
Restrictions imposed: ￿22 = ￿w + M ￿v M0, ￿12 = ￿￿v M0
Test1 is a test of ￿22 = ￿w + M ￿v M0
Test2 is a joint test of ￿22 = ￿w + M ￿v M0 and ￿12 = ￿￿v M0
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